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MAL-WHO? MAL-WHAT? MAL-WHERE?
THE FUTURE CYBER-THREAT OF A NON-FICTION
NEUROMANCER: LEGALLY UN-ATTRIBUTABLE, CYBERSPACEBOUND, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES
Jonathan A. Schnader *
For decades, science fiction writers have tackled philosophical
and existential questions arising from the creation of artificial
intelligence (“AI”) by human beings. AI, however, is no longer a
fictional concept, but rather an evolving part of modern society.
How will AI systems impact United States’ national security
interests? Considering the increased national security threat
coming from actors in cyberspace, policymakers should consider
the cybersecurity risk of AI systems that operate entirely in
cyberspace. This article opines that a serious threat to national
security will arise from a cyberspace-bound, decentralized
autonomous entity (“CyDAE”) because of the “unexplainability” of
current AI system design (that is, the difficulty understanding why
or how the AI arrived at its conclusion or behaved the way it did),
the lack of legal personhood arrangements for autonomous systems,
and the already difficult task of attributing acts in cyberspace to
human actors or States because of outdated Westphalian notions of
sovereignty and territoriality. The article ultimately offers several
broad policy suggestions, including: (1) an AI registry; (2)
“explainability” criteria for AI system designs; (3) requiring human
oversight for legal personhood arrangements (whether arranged in
a corporation, limited liability structure, or otherwise) tailored
specifically for AI autonomous systems that lack human members;
and (4) universal jurisdiction of States over malicious CyDAEs that
obfuscate attributive links to human actors or States.
B.A. Miami University of Ohio, 2008; J.D. Syracuse University College of
Law, 2012; LL.M. in National Security, Georgetown University Law Center,
2019. Many thanks to David Flynn and Professor David Koplow for their
encouragement and support.
*
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Christian Horak, The Future (Of Finance) Is Already Here–It’s Just Not
MAG.
(June
1,
2017),
Evenly
Distributed,
DIGITALIST
https://www.digitalistmag.com/finance/2017/06/01/the-future-of-finance-isalready-here-its-just-not-evenly-distributed-05126253
[https://perma.cc/JC9JRAGY] (referring to a quote by William Gibson originally published in The
Economist on December 4, 2003).
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VIII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................40
I. INTRODUCTION
The science fiction “cyberpunk” author William Gibson
predicted a future where the rise of powerful, disembodied artificial
intelligences, living in the intangible world of “cyberspace,” 2
willfully act with difficult-to-determine purposes and opaque (or
non-existent) human affiliations and loyalties. 3 Stunningly, Gibson
depicts a world of sensory overload where these artificial
intelligences manipulate humans for their own ends, commit crimes
in cyberspace, digitally spar with human hackers, and launch attacks
with kinetics effects, all while grappling with existential issues of
self and other philosophical quandaries. 4 Despite its almost
shocking overlap with the trajectory of technological development,
specifically artificial intelligence, Neuromancer’s haunting future
world has not yet fully materialized. But, as former Assistant
Attorney General John Carlin recently noted: “I think it’s instructive
now to look to movies, to look to science-fiction as we try to think
what the next threats are going to be and how we can prepare for
them.” 5
The rise of artificial intelligence (“AI”) has changed, is
changing, and will change the world, from politics, to social
Gibson continued to issue prophetic and hyper-relevant quotes about the
present and future of technology, even twenty years after the release of his
influential novel Neuromancer: “ ‘Cyberspace’ is a word that’s increasingly long
in the teeth as the reality becomes more ubiquitous by the day.” Joseph Walsh,
Meeting William Gibson, the Father of Cyberpunk, VICE (Dec. 5, 2014),
https://www.vice.com/sv/article/bn5k5m/william-gibson-interview-399
[https://perma.cc/EKZ9-XBUQ].
3
See generally WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (Penguin Random House
2018) (1984). In this science-fiction masterpiece, an “artificial general
intelligence” (“AGI”) entity called “Wintermute,” hires a human hacker to
achieve his only purpose for existence, to merge with another AGI called
“Neuromancer.”
4
Id.
5
Tomayto, Tomahto: Right to Be Forgotten Meets Right to Die, CYBERLAW
PODCAST (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.steptoe.com/feed-Cyberlaw.rss
[https://perma.cc/7DX8-8G6P].
2
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interaction, to economics. However, it is important to note AI will
have a tremendous effect on governments and nation-States
(“States”), particularly on the difficulties AI will pose to national
security. The current presidential administration’s recent decree 6
highlights the importance of AI dominance to the United States’
national security interests.
The application of AI to national security related matters ranges
from autonomous weapons systems 7 to AI-powered facial
recognition 8 to countering terrorist recruitment using AI and
machine learning. 9 The intersection between cybersecurity and AI is
a major area of concern. 10 The past decade has seen an exponential
increase of malicious cyber-activities, orchestrated by both State
and non-State actors alike. Indeed, the Director of National
Intelligence (“DNI”) announced “cyber” to be the first global threat
in this year’s Worldwide Threat Assessment:
Our adversaries and strategic competitors will increasingly use cyber
capabilities – including cyber espionage, attack, and influence – to seek
political, economic, and military advantage over the United States . . . .
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea increasingly use cyber operations
to threaten both minds and machines in an expanding number of ways –

Exec. Order No. 13,859, 3 C.F.R. § 3967 (2019) (“Continued American
leadership in AI is of paramount importance to maintaining the economic and
national security of the United States and to shaping the global evolution of AI in
a manner consistent with our Nation’s values, policies, and priorities.”).
7
See generally PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE, AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND
THE FUTURE OF WAR (2018).
8
See, e.g., Sahil Chinoy, We Built ‘Unbelievable’ (but Legal) Facial
Recognition Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2019/04/16/opinion/facial-recognition-new-york-city.html
[https://perma.cc/SA67-QTK4].
9
Natasha Lomas, Google to Ramp Up AI Efforts to ID Extremism on YouTube,
(June
19,
2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/19/
TECHCRUNCH
google-to-ramp-up-ai-efforts-to-id-extremism-on-youtube/
[https://perma.cc/5YP5-QAQE].
10
Michael C. Horowitz et al., Artificial Intelligence and International Security,
FOR
A
NEW
AMERICAN
SEC.
(July
2018),
CTR.
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-AI-andInternational-Security-July-2018_Final.pdf?mtime=20180709122303
[https://perma.cc/K42U-5QH4].
6
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to steal information, to influence our citizens, or to disrupt critical
infrastructure.” 11

In a recent talk, former FBI Director James Comey reflected on
threats from his tenure: “we see an explosion in nation-state
adversaries and near nation-state actors using the digital vector to
steal all kinds of information and to prepare things that were near to
kinetic acts of war.” 12
Indeed, “attribution,” that is, determining who, or potentially
what, is responsible for a malicious cyber-activity, is already an
incredibly difficult task. There are three types of attribution:
political, 13 technical, and legal. “Technical attribution” is
characterized “as determining the identity or location of an attacker
or an attacker’s intermediary.” 14 Legal attribution “refers to the
assignment of responsibility for an ‘internationally wrongful act to
a state’ ” or non-State actor. 15 Legal attribution requires some
degree of technical attribution; there must be some evidence linking
an actor to the cyber-attack, otherwise the cyber-attack cannot be
qualified as State sponsored or not. Thus, it is important to
understand the strategies for technical attribution, as well as the

11

Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of
Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence), https://www.hsdl.org/
?view&did=820727 [https://perma.cc/TQ3N-6JWP] [hereinafter “Worldwide
Threat Assessment”].
12
Bonus Edition: James Comey at Verify 2019, LAWFARE PODCAST (Apr. 11,
2019, Minute 7:20), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-bonusedition-james-comey-verify-2019 [https://perma.cc/5A6E-ZEME].
13
Political attribution refers to the decision from a diplomatic or policy
standpoint to assign blame to a particular State, group, or individual for a cyberevent. The question of political attribution is a foreign relations decision, and
irrelevant for the purposes of the instant analysis.
14
DAVID A. WHEELER & GREGORY N. LARSEN, INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSIS,
TECHNIQUES
FOR
CYBER
ATTACK
ATTRIBUTION
(Oct.
2003),
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a468859.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S6YK63VE].
15
Jason Jolley, Attribution, State Responsibility, and the Duty to Prevent
Malicious Cyber-Attacks in International Law (Oct. 21, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3056832
[https://perma.cc/469P-4KHN].
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mechanism used by malign cyber actors to frustrate any efforts to
link them to a particular cyber operation.
The emergence of AI has further complicated cyber-attribution
issues. Last year, the first AI driven cyber-attack was reported in
India. The attack “used rudimentary machine learning to observe
and learn patterns of normal user behavior inside a network . . . then
began to mimic that normal behavior, effectively blending into the
background and becoming harder for security tools to spot.” 16 These
type of machine-learning powered attacks are currently rare, but
their emergence signal a worrisome potential trend because they
could permit malign actors to threaten critical infrastructure like
powerplants or nuclear facilities, steal personal data on a massive
scale, or shut down or steal money from financial institutions.
Identifying the human actor who directed an attack from behind
the computer was already difficult to accomplish, often requiring
intelligence gleaned from human spies and electronic sources, in
addition to the legal authority necessary to trace the code
“breadcrumbs” through foreign cyberspace. Forensic evidence of a
malicious cyber-activity’s origin could be masked but never totally
erased. Enter AI. A decentralized AI system, 17 created, released, and
acting on its own without any direction from a human engineer or
creator, could substantially blur any attributive link to an actor or
State.
Even if a government could point a finger at an intangible,
cyberspace-bound, decentralized autonomous AI entity (a
“CyDAE”), what legal authority does a State have to stop a
CyDAE’s malicious cyber-activities? For purposes of jurisdiction,
is the CyDAE “located” where a majority of its servers are located,
or is it where the data it uses is located? Is a CyDAE’s nationality
Steven Norton, Era of AI-Powered Cyberattacks Has Started, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2017/11/15/artificial-intelligencetransforms-hacker-arsenal/ [https://perma.cc/GV57-UGNW].
17
Per Ocean Protocol founder Trent McConaghy, data localization regulations
that require data sets be siloed in a particular State will “massively affect
traditional AI[, b]ut not decentralized AI,” because the “AI compute . . . comes to
the data.” Trent McConaghy, (@trentmc0), TWITTER, (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://twitter.com/trentmc0/status/1104049106220138506
[https://perma.cc/F39N-FGG3].
16

DEC. 2019]

CyDAE

7

correspondent to the nationality of its creators, if their identities can
be ascertained? This AI arrangement adds yet another layer of
ambiguity in terms of attribution. How can we enable action to
combat and/or regulate the use of AI in terms of cybersecurity?
Developing a way to “point the finger”—i.e. impose responsibility
upon AI, specifically CyDAE, or its handlers—is of paramount
importance.
Going forward in this discussion, AI responsibility is essential
to the different levels of AI development. The term “AI,” on the
lower-end of the intelligence spectrum, means “systems that can
emulate, augment, or compete with the performance of intelligent
humans in well-defined tasks.” 18 On the higher end of the
intelligence spectrum is “artificial general intelligence” (“AGI”),
which means a “ ‘strong’ [AI] with the full range of cognitive
capacities typically possessed by humans, including self-awareness”
as is usually depicted in science fiction. 19 The AI discussed in this
paper fall somewhere between the two extremes.
This article will provide a brief technological breakdown about
AI systems. Next, the article will discuss some legal personhood
theories for autonomous AI systems and then summarize the law of
attribution. To tie it all together, the next section will use a CyDAE
example to demonstrate various kinds of cyber-activities that could
be carried out by AI. Penultimately, the article will apply the current
attribution framework to highlight the difficulty CyDAEs will pose
in a legal context. The discussion will end with four bold and
potentially provocative general proposals in order to guide policy
vectors. The proposals are: (1) mandatory registration of AI
systems; (2) a standard of AI system explainability; (3) the creation
of legal personhood arrangements that require human control; and
(4) universal jurisdiction for AI that fail to abide by these legal
standards. Although the threat outlined in this article seems far18
SHANNON VALLOR & GEORGE BEKEY, ROBOT ETHICS 2.0: FROM
AUTONOMOUS CARS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND THE ETHICS OF SELF-LEARNING ROBOTS 339 (Patrick Lin, Ryan Jenkins, &
Keith Abney eds., 2017). This book contains some of the best and most accessible
descriptions, summaries, and explanations of AI systems.
19
Id. at 339–40.
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fetched, we cannot allow the next major threat to our society to
emerge from a failure of imagination.
II. BRIEF TECHNOLOGY BREAKDOWN
This section will define and summarize different conceptual
underpinnings. At least some AI experts consider AI to be “a set that
contains machine learning (ML), and deep learning (DL).” 20
Therefore, an independent, decentralized artificial intelligence
capable of engaging in malicious cyber-activities would likely be
technologically sophisticated, so understanding how the technology
works may help us understand the legal ramifications of such
activities. The same is true for deterring, detecting, and combatting
malicious cyber-activities: without a baseline technical
understanding, relevant legal frameworks cannot be applied
meaningfully.
One of the first approaches used to create AI was a “rule-based”
method, that is, a programmer would create a set of rules that the
system would have to check for each decision or instance of
learning. While rule-based methods have important uses, “[t]rying
to hand-code a set of rules for a machine . . . to visually distinguish
between an apple and a tomato [for example] would be challenging.
Both objects are round, red, and shiny with a green stem on top.” 21
Rule-based approaches are considered “top-down” because of how
the over-arching rules are applied to the learning process. Rather
than a top-down, rule-based approach, typical AI models utilize
“bottom-up” approaches: complex mathematical formulas known as
“algorithms” parse millions of pieces of data in search for patterns.
The exponential increase in computing power and availability of
voluminous categorized datasets opened the door for these
breakthrough techniques in AI system design.

20
Oludare Isaac Abiodun et al., State-of-the-Art in Artificial Neural Network
Applications: A Survey, 4 HELIYON 11 (2018).
21
PAUL SCHARRE & MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC.,
ARTIFICAL INTELLIGENCE: WHAT EVERY POLICYMAKER NEEDS TO KNOW (2018),
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/artificial-intelligence-what-everypolicymaker-needs-to-know [https://perma.cc/6UL3-A9TH].
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A. AI Uses and Advantages
What about AI in general makes it appealing for human
productivity? “In some cases, their value may come from being
cheaper, faster, or easier to deploy at scale relative to human
expertise.” 22 Beyond general qualities like “data classification,”
“detection,” “prediction,” and “optimization” of efficiency, AI
systems seem to be trending toward “faster-than-human reaction
times”; “superhuman precision and reliability”; “superhuman
patience and vigilance”; as well as ability to conduct “operations
without connections to humans.” 23 The utility of Artifical Neural
Networks (“ANNs”) in particular transcend human capabilities in a
myriad of fields including “computer security, medical science,
business, finance, bank[ing], insurance, the stock market, electricity
generation, management, nuclear industry, mineral exploration,
mining, crude oil fractions quality prediction, crops yield prediction,
water treatment, and policy.” 24
B. Machine Learning
Machine learning is “a developmental process in which repeated
exposures of a system to an information-rich environment gradually
produce, expand, enhance, or reinforce that system’s behavioral and
cognitive competence in that environment or relevantly similar
ones.” 25 In simple terms, “[g]iven a goal, learning machines adjust
their behavior to optimize their performance to achieve that goal.” 26
So, with regard to the example of a tomato and an apple above:
[A]n algorithm might take as input millions of labeled images, such as
“dog,” “person,” “apple.” The algorithm then learns subtle patterns
within the images to distinguish between categories – for example,
between an apple and a tomato . . . . Given enough labeled images of
both, machines can also learn these differences and then distinguish
between an apple and a tomato when they are not labeled. 27
22

Id.
Id.
24
Abiodun et al., supra note 20, at 20. For the authors’ assessment of ANNs’
applicability in each field on various data analysis factors, see tbl. 1, fig. 7, at 19–
20.
25
VALLOR & BEKEY, supra note 18, at 340.
26
SCHARRE & HOROWITZ, supra note 21.
27
Id.
23
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As AI system design improved, sub-types of machine learning
proliferated, although in-depth descriptions of those methods are
beyond the scope of this article. 28 Notably, however, the current state
of machine learning is far from the level of sophistication needed
for an advanced, standalone CyDAE that would be able to exist
completely independent from human handlers.
C. Artificial Neural Networks (“ANNs”) & Deep Learning
Considering the plasticity and adaptability of the human brain,
it is no wonder that some forms of machine learning borrow
concepts from human neuroscience. Simply, “[h]uman brains are
made up of connected networks of neurons . . . . ANNs seek to
simulate these networks and get computers to act like interconnected
brain cells, so they can learn and make decisions in a more
humanlike manner.” 29 For instance, “the network gradually ‘learns’
from repeated ‘experience’ (multiple training runs with input
datasets) how to optimize the machine’s ‘behavior’ (outputs) for a
given kind of task.” 30
These ANNs, much like the human brain, can create stronger or
weaker associations between connections in the hidden layers,
which will result in the AI system’s behavior adapting and adjusting
There are several subtypes of machine learning: supervised, unsupervised,
reinforcement, etc. For a quality discussion, see SCHARRE & HOROWITZ, supra
note 21. “Supervised” means the extent to which the training data is explicitly
labeled by humans to tell the system which classifications it should learn to make
(as opposed to letting the system construct its own classification or groupings).”
VALLOR & BEKEY, supra note 18, at 341. Alternatively, “unsupervised” machine
learning is essentially a programmed form of trial-and-error, without outside help:
“unsupervised learning methods form clusters or groups between and among the
objects in an area to identify likeness, then use similarity for classifying
unknowns.” Abiodun et al., supra note 20, at 10. Some subtypes of supervised
learning models include single-layer perception; multi-layer perception; linear
classifiers; support vector machines; k-nearest neighbors; Bayesian statistics;
decision trees; and hidden Markov models. Id. at 11. Some unsupervised learning
model sub-types include k-means; expectation maximization; auto-encoders;
density-based models; self-organizing maps; and clustering. Id.
29
Bernard Marr, Deep Learning Vs Neural Networks – What’s the Difference?,
BERNARD MARR & CO., https://bernardmarr.com/default.asp?contentID=1789
[https://perma.cc/833M-4RY5].
30
VALLOR & BEKEY, supra note 18, at 340 (emphasis in original).
28
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to changing scenarios. 31 “Whereas machine-learning algorithms
require the features they look for in data to be pre-set, deep-learning
neural net[works] can determine and detect salient features on their
own.” 32 Self-driving cars are a useful example. If the system learned
what a “bicyclist” is from various dataset depicting or describing
bicyclists being input into the system over time, then when the
system detects a bicyclist, it will learn to adjust its behavior over
time, and eventually be able to “slow down slightly, edge to the leftcenter of the lane.” 33
Creating and implementing “hybrid” designs of AI systems that
incorporate overarching “top-down” rules to govern the “bottomup” processes, are critical to the future regulation of AI. 34 This kind
of “hybrid” approach will give developers greater control over their
AI systems:
The potential for the misalignment of interest [between the AI system’s
objectives and those of the public at large] flows from the fact that an
AI’s objectives are determined by its initial programming. Even if that
initial programming permits or encourages the AI to alter its objectives
based on subsequent experiences, those alterations will occur in
accordance with the dictates of the initial programming . . . [which]
seems beneficial in terms of maintaining control. After all, if humans are
the ones doing the initial programming, they have free rein to shape the
AI’s objectives. 35

D. Black Box and Explainability Issues
The “black box” or “explainability” problem is a major hurdle
for AI developers. 36
The term ‘black box’ has long been used in science and engineering to
denote technology systems and devices that function without divulging
Id. at 341.
John Fletcher, Deepfakes, Artificial Intelligence, and Some Kind of Dystopia:
The New Faces of Online Post-Fact Performance, 70 THEATRE J. 455, 459 (2018).
33
VALLOR & BEKEY, supra note 18, at 341.
34
See WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING
ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 117 (2009).
35
Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks,
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 367
(2016).
36
For an in-depth discussion of built in morality and ethical rules in AI systems
design, see WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 34, at 73.
31
32
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their inner workings. The inputs and outputs of the ‘black box’ system
may be visible, but the actual implementation of the technology is
opaque, hidden from understanding or justifiability. 37

Put another way, when necessary to understand either the
programming, coding, or motives of a particular AI, the AI system’s
process is often so opaque because of the sheer complexity of the
code, or by an advertent wall created by the programmers to
obfuscate that code. Opacity of an AI system means “the inner
workings of an AI system may be kept secret and may not be
susceptible to reverse engineering.” 38 “The ‘black box’ concept has
been exploited by the likes of Silicon Valley start-ups to Wall Street
investment firms, usually in their efforts to protect intellectual
property and maintain competitiveness.” 39 Opaque code should not
be permitted solely in order to protect proprietary information,
shield a company or individual from liability, or evade detection for
some insidious or criminal reason.
But, opacity of AI systems may not purely be based on the
designers’ intent to shield the inner workings of their code from
view, but might instead be a symptom of the complexity of AI
system technology. At least one scholar has articulated the difficulty
AI system designers must face when balancing their systems’
complexity, transparency, proprietary information security,
explainability, and functionality: if algorithms can “be so complex
that meaningful transparency is impossible . . . [s]hould robots be
designed to be ‘closed,’ in the sense that they have a set, dedicated
function and run only proprietary software . . . [o]r can companies
design robots to be ‘open’ without incurring liability?” 40 Black box
AI would likely present difficulties in terms of government audits,

KYNDI, HOW ‘EXPLAINABILITY’ IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 2 (Jan. 2018), https://kyndi.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/
Kyndi-final-Explainable-AI-White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HJJ-2M57].
38
Scherer, supra note 35, at 369.
39
KYNDI, supra note 37.
40
Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 809–
21 (2015). While the issue of liability is only tangentially related to this
discussion, it is important to note that the manner in which AI creators program
intentionality or motivation will come up in future legal discussions due to the
inextricable and unavoidable nexus between mental state and culpability.
37
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“especially crucial for critical organizations that are required to
explain the reason for any decision.” 41
Moreover, the explainability problem may limit the ability of
programmers and creators to know the source of a problem with the
AI system’s function. In a discussion of machine learning
algorithms and facial recognition, professor Nick Weaver noted the
following serious issues for the technology:
When applied to face recognition there are huge biases turning up . . . we
don’t know whether this is biases in the training set or if there actually
might be technical or cultural features or some other aspects that are
resulting in these biases and we can’t because these systems are designed
as unknowable black boxes. 42

But, policy and legislation in western democracies seems to
highlight why an emphasis on explainable AI systems may benefit
society. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(“DARPA”), a research agency within the U.S. Department of
Defense (“DoD”), spearheads AI initiatives that have already
encountered such problems, succinctly describing “black box”
issues they expect to confront in developing autonomous weapons
systems:
Continued advances [in AI] promise to produce autonomous systems that
will perceive, learn, decide, and act on their own. However, the
effectiveness of these systems is limited by the machine’s current
inability to explain their decisions and actions to human users . . . .
[DoD] is facing challenges that demand more intelligent, autonomous,
and symbiotic systems. Explainable AI – especially explainable machine
learning – will be essential if future warfighters are to understand,
appropriately trust, and effectively manage an emerging generation of
artificially intelligent machine partners. 43

In the European Union (“EU”), the General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) imposes explainability requirements for
automated systems writing: “the data controller shall implement
suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and
KYNDI, supra note 37, at 7.
Death of Section 230, THE CYBERLAW PODCAST (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://www.steptoe.com/feed-Cyberlaw.rss [https://perma.cc/7DX8-8G6P].
43
Matt Turek, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), DEFENSE ADVANCED
RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainableartificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/UET8-FETE].
41
42
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freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human
intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point
of view and to contest the decision.” 44 Without using the phrase
“explainability,” the GDPR codifies the requirement that a system
be explainable by requiring human review of any AI system
determinations. Although it did not become law, the EU parliament
proposed a resolution about AI and robotics, noting the importance
of transparency for AI systems, highlighting
the principle of transparency, namely that it should always be possible to
supply the rationale behind any decision taken with the aid of AI that can
have substantive impact on one or more persons’ lives; considers that it
must always be possible to reduce the AI system’s computations to a
form comprehensible by humans; considers that advanced robots should
be equipped with a ‘black box’ which records data on every transaction
carried out by the machine, including the logic that contributed to its
decisions. 45

Issues surrounding black box algorithms used in popular social
media platforms have prompted self-reflection by the controllers of
those platforms, 46 but also criticism from scholars who point how
innovation might suffer from black box regulation. One critic
explained that attempting to regulate unexplainable AI systems
GDPR, Ch. 3, Art. 22, § 3 (emphasis supplied). Indeed, the eponymous term
“controller” means a “natural or legal person” that defines the parameters of data
processing for an autonomous system. Thus, a controller under the GDPR’s
jurisdiction must be able to give a data subject an explanation as to why an
autonomous system arrived at its conclusion.
45
European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with
Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, Civil Law
Rules on Robotics (2015/2103 (INL)) at ¶12.
46
See, e.g., Jason Bloomberg, Don’t Trust Artificial Intelligence? Time to Open
the AI “Black Box,” FORBES (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jasonbloomberg/2018/09/16/dont-trust-artificial-intelligence-time-to-open-theai-black-box/#103079dd3b4a [https://perma.cc/7S9S-7RLQ] (quoting Twitter
CEO Jack Dorsey: “[w]e need to do a much better job at explaining how our
algorithms work . . . [i]deally opening them up so that people can actually see how
they work.”). Also, in a discussion about Google’s “black box” YouTube search
algorithm, former NSA General Counsel and former Assistant Secretary for
Policy at DHS, Stewart Baker said “[w]e are never going to know how this [search
algorithm] works. Google is basically saying ‘trust us, we’ll do the right thing . . .’
I have zero faith in YouTube’s willingness to play it straight.” Tomayto, Tomahto:
Right to be Forgotten Meets Right to Die, supra note 5.
44
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“significantly raises labor costs and thus creates a strong
disincentive from using AI – as a main reason for developing AI in
the first place is to automate functions that would otherwise be much
slower, costlier, and more difficult to complete if performed by
humans.” 47
Notwithstanding the policy arguments in favor of or against
explainable AI systems in the current state of the technology, the
opacity of unexplainable systems will pose serious problems to
investigators seeking to make attributive links through analysis of
AI system processes.
E. Decentralization
In order to understand how AI use and consume data, it is
essential to understand how data is stored. Data can be stored in a
“centralized” way, meaning the data is contained on a single server,
hard drive, or network, or, alternatively, controlled by a single
entity.
Data can be processed simultaneously in multiple locations [by that
entity]; dispersed for storage around the globe; re-combined
instantaneously; and moved across borders by individuals carrying
mobile devices . . . [s]ervices, such as ‘cloud computing,’ allow
[organizations] and individuals to access data that may be stored
anywhere in the world. 48

If we analogize data to grain, “centralized” storage of grain might
be that all of a Farmer’s grain is stored in one warehouse, or in one
silo, in a building on one farm, all controlled by a single Farmer. In
contrast, data can be stored in a “decentralized” fashion, meaning
the data need not be contained in a single, discreet location. Rather,
data can be separated, and stored on thousands of different networks,

NICK WALLACE & DANIEL CASTRO, CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION, THE
IMPACT OF THE EU’S NEW DATA PROTECTION REGULATION ON AI 2 (Mar. 27,
2018),
http://www2.datainnovation.org/2018-impact-gdpr-ai.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PB2C-NFUJ].
48
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK: SUPPLEMENTARY EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
TO THE REVISED OECD PRIVACY GUIDELINES 29 (2013), https://www.oecd.org/
sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7FL-TFP2].
47
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and still retrieved later. 49 Using the grain example above,
decentralized grain storage would mean that the specific individual
pieces of the Farmer’s grain are stored in many silos, many
warehouses, or across many farms, rather than just in the Farmer’s
silo. The grain analogy fails, however, when it comes to retrieval of
data versus retrieval of grain in a decentralized paradigm. It would
be nearly impossible for the Farmer to separate each individual piece
of his/her grain and retrieve all those exact pieces of grain. However,
with modern computing and advances in technology, data can be
separated, dispersed across myriad networks, and retrieved without
fail. Importantly, decentralization does not apply solely to data; any
network protocol, function, or transmission of information can
implement decentralization—whether it be computing, financial
transactions, or communications.
Many characteristics of decentralization make it an attractive
approach to computing and storage of data. Vitalik Buterin
identifies, in relevant part, two key reasons for decentralization:
Fault tolerance – decentralized systems are less likely to fail
accidentally because they rely on many separate components . . . [and]
Attack resistance – decentralized systems are more expensive to attack
and destroy or manipulate because they lack sensitive central points that
can be attacked at a much lower cost . . . . 50

From a practical perspective, decentralization happens when
computer or network operators install a particular program or
protocol’s software and act as a “node,” that is, software on a
computer that participates as one point in a network of computers
associated by the commonly-installed program. Thus, if one specific
node is attacked or breaks down, unlike a single centralized network
The creator of the Ethereum Network, Vitalik Buterin, and one of the
foremost thinkers in the blockchain and decentralized computer space, in a
comprehensive and technical discussion of decentralization, identifies three types
of decentralization in terms of computer networks: 1) architectural, that is, the
number of physical computers; 2) political, that is, how many individuals control
the computer network; and 3) logical, whether the interface and data structures
that the system presents and maintains look “more like a single monolithic object,
or an amorphous swarm.” Vitalik Buterin, The Meaning of Decentralization,
MEDIUM (Feb. 6, 2017), https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/the-meaning-ofdecentralization-a0c92b76a274 [https://perma.cc/R9FR-2YW8].
50
Id.
49
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node, a decentralized network can still function even if “five out of
ten computers” fail simultaneously. 51 “[T]he principle is
uncontroversial, and is used in real life in many situations, including
jet engines, backup power generators particularly in places like
hospitals,
military
infrastructure,
[and] financial portfolio diversification . . . . ” 52 Simplistically,
decentralization creates a vast fail-safe web of nodes rather than
consolidating information or computing power in a single place or
on a single network.
A decentralized AI system would thus benefit from fault
tolerance and attack resistance, much like decentralized data
platforms do. The result would be an AI system with an uncertain
physical location, immunity to cyberattack, and temporal longevity
because of the unlikely possibility of accidental failure.
Taken together, the attributes described above paint a potentially
troubling picture of an independent entity that, through deep neural
networks, learns on its own and prevents observers from
understanding how it works technically because its code is obscured
by an unexplainable black box, all while being resistant to attacks
and difficult to locate by virtue of its networks’ decentralization.
III. EMERGENCE OF CYDAES AS LEGAL PERSONS
In the recent past, Saudi Arabia granted citizenship to a “female”
AI called “Sophia,” 53 but the act by the kingdom appears to be more
ceremonial and symbolic than legal in nature. Trent McConaghy, a
notable AI researcher, presciently opined about “Decentralized
Autonomous Organizations” (“DAOs”) and their inevitable joinder
with AI, “DAOs have arrived . . . [a]nd when artificial intelligence
gets added to the mix, the results are explosive.” 54 Similarly, one
51

Id.
Id.
53
Dom Galeon, World’s First AI Citizen in Saudi Arabia Is Calling for
Women’s Rights, SCIENCEALERT (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.sciencealert.com/
first-ai-citizen-saudia-arabia-womens-rights [https://perma.cc/R8XT-X35G].
54
Trent McConaghy, AI DAOs, and Three Paths to Get There, MEDIUM (June
18, 2016), https://medium.com/@trentmc0/ai-daos-and-three-paths-to-get-therecfa0a4cc37b8 [https://perma.cc/3VDT-B4J7].
52
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legal scholar paints the “explosive results” of AI DAOs (he calls
them “algorithmic entities”) in a much more grim light:
[b]ecause they lack human bodies, [algorithmic entities] are harder to
catch and impossible to punish. [They] need not fear death or capture.
They can replicate themselves without ego and sacrifice themselves
without motive. They need not recoil at the necessity to do violence to
humans. 55

So, how will the law handle these non-human entities? How do
we get to a world with AI existing as legal persons? This section will
discuss a few ways that an AI might be structured as a legal person.
A. Legal Personhood
“[I]t is unlikely that, in a future society where artificial agents
wield significant amount of executive power, anything would be
gained by continuing to deny them legal personality.” 56 Denying AI
legal personality out of vanity is one issue, but would it not actually
be beneficial for people to categorize and legalize AI entities so they
fit in our rigid legal paradigms? Notwithstanding current technical
limitations that prevent AI systems from becoming truly
autonomous and/or self-governing, the state of the law now
probably precludes AI systems from becoming independent legal
entities. 57 But, importantly, the issue of legal personhood arises in
discussions about who is liable for the acts of AI systems. Some
scholars rely on “agency” as the legal framework to support liability
when people are hurt by AI systems, 58 while others point to legal
personhood arrangements. 59 But, other theoretical and hypothetical
proposals for legal personhood arrangements for AI or otherwise
autonomous systems are not so far-fetched.
Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U.L. REV. 887, 891–92
(2018).
56
SAMIR CHOPRA & LAWRENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR
AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 191 (2011).
57
Law professor Shawn Bayern disagrees. See generally Shawn Bayern, The
Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous
Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93 (2015) (discussing how existing business
entity law in the United States suffices for bestowing legal personhood on
autonomous systems).
58
See WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 34; CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 56.
59
See generally Bayern, supra note 57; LoPucki, supra note 55.
55
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B. Autonomous Self-Owning Cars
One interesting way that people have imagined AI existing
independently from human beings is in the context of driverless,
autonomous rideshares that own themselves. 60 Much like “the
DAO” and AI DAOs discussed below, these driverless cars would
accept cryptocurrency as payment, and use the proceeds of their
“work” to buy fuel, purchase software updates, and pay premiums
into an insurance pool with other autonomous self-driving cars. 61
One proposal, “car-ception,” would allow an AI-powered car to
slowly save up enough money to afford buying a new model to put on
the road at some point in the future . . . Since the old car is buying the
new car, it will technically be the new [car’s] owner. It can also arrange
to have all of its remaining wealth transferred to the new [car’s] digital
wallet . . . . 62

Indeed, one of the similarities between these autonomous driverless
car models is that they would operate in conjunction with
decentralized platforms, particularly blockchain platforms. 63
C. “The DAO”
“The DAO,” not to be confused with DAOs generally, was both
a breakthrough and a failed experiment in decentralized technology
in cyberspace. The DAO was an investment fund built on the
Ethereum blockchain in which “[p]articipants buy in to the fund by
purchasing digital tokens, then introduce, view, and vote on pitches;
the company’s smart code then automatically executes winning

See, e.g., Leo Kelion, Could Driverless Cars Own Themselves?, BBC (Feb.
16, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30998361 [https://perma.cc/
YP45-MNUL].
61
Chris Czupak, The Self Owning Car, MEDIUM (May 8, 2018),
https://medium.com/@chris_czupak/the-self-owning-car-dd1b39b95748
[https://perma.cc/RTE5-WP9P].
62
Id.
63
Thomas Birr & Carsten Stöker, Goodbye Car Ownership, Hello Clean Air:
Welcome to the Future of Transport, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Dec. 16, 2016),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/goodbye-car-ownership-hello-cleanair-this-is-the-future-of-transport/ [https://perma.cc/FN7N-L7FR].
60
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projects” using the tokens they purchased. 64 The Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) described it as:
a ‘virtual’ organization embodied in computer code and executed on a
distributed ledger or blockchain. The DAO was created . . . with the
object of operating as a for-profit entity that would create and hold a
corpus of assets through the sale of DAO Tokens to investors, which
would then be used to fund ‘projects.’ The holders of DAO Tokens stood
to share in anticipated earnings from these projects as a return on their
investment . . . . 65

“The DAO” managed to raise $150 million in a private sale of
its digital tokens, but hackers exploited its programming, resulting
in the theft of approximately $50 million. 66 The DAO’s reliance on
human beings separates it from Trent McConaghy’s vision of future
AI DAOs, and at least one legal scholar has proclaimed the DAO’s
name a misnomer because its arrangement lacked true autonomy. 67
D. The “ArtDAO”
McConaghy suggests a canvas for a reasonable application of a
decentralized autonomous organization governed by AI, which he
calls the “ArtDAO.” 68 In essence, McConaghy’s “ArtDAO recipe”
requires an AI process (ANNs, etc.), decentralized by virtue of the
Ori Oren, ICO’s, DAO’s, and the SEC: A Partnership Solution, 2018 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 617, 618 (2018). For a full and cogent discussion of the DAO,
blockchain and smart contracts, etc., see Laila Metjahic, Deconstructing the DAO:
The Need for Legal Recognition and the Application of Securities Laws to
Decentralized Organizations, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1533, 1544–45 (2018).
65
U.S. SEC. & EXC. COMM., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION
21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5BJ4-LHZ7].
66
For a more in-depth discussion of The DAO’s background see Cristoph
Jentzsch, History of the DAO and Lessons Learned, MEDIUM (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://blog.slock.it/the-history-of-the-dao-and-lessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5
[https://perma.cc/6HF3-EBXW]; Brian Yurcan, Despite the DAO-saster, its
BANKER
(Mar.
30,
2017),
creators
raise
$2M,
AM .
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/despite-the-dao-saster-its-creators-raise2m [https://perma.cc/4843-U3UL].
67
Metjahic, supra note 64.
68
Trent McConaghy, Wild, Wooly, AI DAOs, MEDIUM (June 22, 2016),
https://medium.com/@trentmc0/wild-wooly-ai-daos-d1719e040956
[https://perma.cc/|R8RD-H927].
64
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blockchain, to generate artistic images. 69 The AI then “claims
attribution of the image in a time-stamp to the blockchain” and, after
creating multiple editions, “posts those editions for sale onto a
marketplace.” 70 After, “[i]t sells the editions” and “transfers the
proceeds from the buyer to ArtDAO” using cryptocurrency, then
transfers the rights to the art to the buyer. 71 As it continues to create
new digital art, the ArtDAO earns proceeds in cryptocurrency. The
imaginative, and winsome ArtDAO seems like a trouble-free
manifestation of a CyDAE, but as an example, it demonstrates how
easily an independent and autonomous AI entity could exist without
human guardianship or oversight. 72
The ability for an autonomous system to manage money, make
decisions for itself, independent of human oversight or approval, all
with a particular goal in mind will underpin the structure of
CyDAEs. These traits that allow AI systems to exist independently
will function together to obfuscate any CyDAE’s connection human
handlers and make attribution of its actions challenging.
IV. LAW OF ATTRIBUTION OF CYBER-ACTIVITIES
Understanding the difficulties that a future CyDAE would pose
to the national security of the United States requires a discussion of
international legal principles surrounding attribution. If a future
CyDAE were stateless and its location were impossible to
determine, or if it were linked to a foreign State, then international

69

Id.
Id. A full discussion of “blockchain” is outside the scope of this article, but
the blockchain is an immutable, public, secure, and decentralized ledger of
transactions, existing simultaneously on many computers. Blockchain
popularized and most often contextualized in terms of cryptocurrencies,
specifically, Bitcoin. McConaghy’s ArtDAO relies upon the Ethereum
blockchain, which is essentially a protocol allowing the execution of simple,
automatic commands called “smart contracts.” See Metjahic, supra note 64, for
an in-depth and cogently written discussion of blockchain and smart contracts.
71
McConaghy, supra note 68.
72
The ArtDAO illuminates substantial legal impediments in the current legal
framework, particularly in terms of personhood, discussed in Part III, Subsection
D.
70
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legal principles would apply. 73 Prominently featured as the first
discussion point in the 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment
delivered to Congress, the DNI declared that “[t]he risk is growing
that some adversaries will conduct cyber[-]attacks . . . against the
United States in a crisis short of war.” 74 Notably, the DNI posits that
the threat is one “short of war,” meaning the threat derives from
cyber-attacks that do not rise to the level of armed attack or use of
force, 75 and thus principles of jus ad bellum or jus in bello do not
apply. 76 The international legal community agrees that the law of
State Responsibility applies, in this cyber context, under Customary
International Law (“CIL”) and the Draft Articles on Responsibility
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles”) that codified
CIL. However, the CIL and Draft Articles are not apt instruments
for dealing with cyberspace issues. The CIL and Draft Articles
evolved based on State behavior in an analog world rigidly attached
to traditional norms of territory and sovereignty, whereas
cyberspace emerged subsequent to those instruments as a dimension
that both transcends and undermines those traditional norms.
A. Three Types of Attribution
There are three types of attribution: political, 77 technical, and
legal. “Technical attribution” is characterized “as determining the
identity or location of an actor or an actor’s intermediary.” 78 “Legal
attribution,” in terms of State action, “refers to assignment of
responsibility for an ‘internationally wrongful act to a State.’” 79
73
United States domestic authorities grant the intelligence community and
military broad discretion in defending against malicious cyber-activities, so for
the purposes of this article, domestic legal authority is assumed.
74
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S Intelligence Community: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 5 (2018) (statement of Daniel
R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence).
75
Id.; see also UN Charter arts. 2(4); 51.
76
Jus ad bellum refers to the legal rules governing whether a State is justified
engaging in warfare and jus in bello refers to the rules that apply during war.
77
Political attribution refers to the decision from a diplomatic or policy
standpoint to assign blame to a particular State, group, or individual for a cyberevent. The question of political attribution is a foreign relations decision, and
irrelevant for the purposes of the instant analysis.
78
Wheeler & Larsen, supra note 14, at 1.
79
Jolley, supra note 15, at 150–51.
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Indeed, without technical attribution, legal attribution becomes
impossible—without technically attributing an act to an actor, it is
impossible to declare that a cyber-activity reached the legal quantum
of evidence required to achieve legal attribution.
B. The Current Attribution Standard in International Law under
the Law of State Responsibility
State Responsibility under CIL and the Draft Articles generally
requires that a State be responsible for its own bad behavior and the
bad behavior of agents working on its behalf. This body of law predates cyberspace, and it thus contemplates State behavior in an
analog world rather than behavior in cyberspace. In other words, it
accounts for acts and behavior that occur in conjunction with
traditional Westphalian notions of sovereignty and territoriality.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the framework, the
international legal community agrees that it applies to cyberspace
and cyber-activities. 80 There are two somewhat overlapping
approaches to the State Responsibility framework: (1) the “effective
control” test, and (2) the “complete dependence” test. The “effective
control” test established by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)
in the Nicaragua Case 81 is used to determine whether independent
actors were sufficiently under the State’s authority and control for
their acts to be attributable to the State. For a State to “effectively
control” a group, the State must “direct[] or enforce[] the
perpetration of the acts,” 82 thus demonstrating a high level of State
control. On the other hand, the even more stringent “complete
dependence” test requires one to establish that a non-State actor is
an “organ” of the State; in other words, that an agency relationship
exists between that actor and the State. The burden of proof for both
tests is “clear and convincing evidence.” 83

80
See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE 29 (Michael Schmitt ed. 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
81
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 190 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua
Case].
82
Id. at ¶ 105.
83
See id. at ¶¶ 386–94.
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C. Technical Attribution Strategies and Difficulties
The challenges of attribution have attracted substantial attention
from legal scholars. 84 The experts behind the second iteration of the
Tallinn Manual 85 concluded that even if a state provides “the cyber
tools, identif[ies] the targets, and select[s] the date for the cyber
operation” it would still not necessarily rise to the requisite level of
attribution to the State under the “effective control” standard. 86 The
difficulty lies in the structure of the internet itself and in its function.
As one scholar explained, “[t]he totality of the [i]nternet operates to
deny positive technical attribution to the individual creating multiple
barriers for positive technical attribution by computer scientists.” 87
The main issue in regard to technical attribution is the missing
link between the computer itself and the identity of the human being
acting behind that computer. This problem of technical attribution
can be characterized as an identification issue: “there are no known
means to date of positively identifying an author of an attack without
having physical control over the computer system in which the code
for the [malicious program] was written and then only if computer
forensics can recover the data.” 88 Locating, obtaining, and

See, e.g., Jolley, supra note 15, at 27 (“[P]roperly identifying the author of a
cyber-attack is difficult, if not impossible: there are no means readily available to
identify who authored an attack.”); Christian Payne & Lorraine Finlay,
Addressing Obstacles to Cyber-Attribution: A Model Based on State Response to
Cyber-Attack, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 535, 568 (2017) (“The novel
characteristics of cyber-attacks make the existing standards of proof and degrees
of control required to establish attribution extremely difficult to determine.”).
85
The Tallinn Manual is a guiding document based on “the views of a group of
renown experts on the application of international law to cyber activities,”
intended to help the international legal community understand cyber issues. Eric
Talbot Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and Insights, 48 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 735, 735 (2017).
86
Id. at 752.
87
Jolley, supra note 15, at 148. These barriers include “TOR” network and
proxy servers, which obscure the identification of a computer by bouncing signals
and packets around global networks.
88
Id. at 171–72. Department of Justice attorney, Leonard Bailey, would
disagree that the task is impossible. Rather, investigators (like DOJ or FBI
investigators) have tools that can overcome many of the difficulties in attributing
malicious cyber-activities to an individual or group. Interview with Leonard
84
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examining a computer suspected of being a terminal for a domestic
cybercriminal can already be a challenging task for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) engaged in cyber investigations.
However, because the FBI has a specialized cyber-toolkit, although
it may still be difficult, they have capabilities for detecting, tracking,
and ultimately finding the source of a cyber-crime in the domestic
United States. 89 The Department of Justice outlines several broad
investigative strategies for dealing with cyber-crime:
The key methods and sources of evidence for disrupting cyber threats
include: gathering materials during incident response; reviewing open
source data; conducting online reconnaissance; searching records from
online providers; undertaking undercover investigations; engaging in
authorized electronic surveillance; tracing financial transactions;
searching storage media; and applying a variety of special techniques. 90

However, identification becomes a tricky exercise when the
source of malicious cyber-activity originates from a foreign State.
In these situations, the investigator’s toolbox shrinks. The
investigator must consider the effect of his/her action on complex
issues of law, policy, and politics. Often, such decisions would
require authorization from high-level officials that may be difficult
to obtain because of the complexity of the issues involved, like
sovereignty, territoriality, and foreign relations. “[I]nvestigators
also must work cooperatively with foreign partners to access
evidence and disrupt transnational cyber threats.” 91 The task of
gathering evidence abroad increases in complexity and difficulty
when investigators need access to information or evidence in a State
with which the United States has rocky or hostile relationships, like
China, Iran, Russia, or North Korea.
There are three categories of technical attribution: indirect,
forensic, and, to repeat the more general principle’s name, technical.
Bailey, Special Counsel for National Security, Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (Mar. 26, 2019).
89
See, e.g., CYBER-DIGITAL TASK FORCE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
CYBER-DIGITAL TASK FORCE 49–82 (July 2, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/ag/
page/file/1076696/download [https://perma.cc/JM44-XY2Q] [hereinafter DOJ
Cyber Report].
90
Id. at 49.
91
Id.
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“Indirect attribution” typically uses manifold techniques, including
traditional intelligence gathering tools; law enforcement strategies;
computer forensics and programs; and potential motives to
circumstantially link an actor to a particular attack. Indeed, a
determination of motive cannot be understated. And, at the very
least, using process of elimination could reduce the number of
suspects to consider; for instance, why would an allied State actor
commit a ransomware 92 attack against the United States? 93 “Forensic
attribution” uses malware evaluation, computer forensics, and code
analysis to determine who authored the cyber-attack, while the
specific category of technical attribution uses various computer
science techniques to trace the signal to its origin. 94
One of the biggest difficulties lies in the speed at which
malicious cyber actors incorporate and use new technology. Every
advancement in technical attribution computer science is learned
and employed quickly by those malicious cyber actors. Similarly, a
malicious cyber actor need not generate original code to deploy
malware. Instead, these actors often reuse malware programs; thus
even if the malware is traced to its original author, it may not
elucidate who actually used it in a specific attack. 95 Likewise, the
increased use of Tor, IP masking through spoofing and/or through
proxy servers, as well as false attribution trails make the trail of
breadcrumbs for forensic scientists long, slow, and difficult to
follow. 96

92
“Ransomware” is a malicious program activated when an unsuspecting
person clicks a hyperlink in an email, for instance. When the ransomware program
runs, it spreads through the victim network and locks the network completely,
threatening to erase the network’s data or indefinitely deny access unless the
victim pays a ransom, usually in cryptocurrency. Once the ransom is paid, the
network is usually released.
93
Interview with Leonard Bailey, supra note 88.
94
Jolley, supra note 15, at 141. These technical attribution techniques include
recursive tracebacks, stepping stones, honey pots, authorship attribution,
attribution of files, manual attribution, inter alia.
95
Id.
96
For a discussion of how Tor networks work, see PANAYOTIS A.
YANNAKOGEORGOS, STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING THE CYBER ATTRIBUTION
CHALLENGE 14–18 (May 2016), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/
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What if the cyber-threat arose from a CyDAE, not controlled by
a human handler, orchestrating cyber-activities on its own
prerogative? The rules of legal attribution are difficult enough for
attributing acts to human actors and States without a sophisticated
CyDAE intermediary further obscuring attributive links. The next
section addresses this pressing issue.
V. THE THREAT OF A CYDAE
Imagine a decentralized intelligent entity, existing on thousands
of computers, disembodied and intangible, residing only in
cyberspace. Both its origin and its existence are unknown. Perhaps
it is a web or network of “swarm intelligences,” different, smaller
AI organs that play off each other, contributing to the greater
CyDAE, 97 exemplifying the adage “the whole is greater than the sum
of its parts.” What is known is that it was created by humans, but it
is unclear whether human involvement continues to contribute to its
development. Indeed, “[b]y definition, the initiator of a[] [CyDAE]
would neither own the entity nor control it after launch. The initiator
would, however, have the opportunity to set the algorithm’s
objectives prior to launch.” 98 Still more worrisome, unlike the
ArtDAO with a purpose to create art, or autonomous self-owning
cars with a purpose to offer rides to humans, the CyDAE’s apparent
purpose may not always be benevolent and could easily undertake a
purpose to orchestrate cyber-attacks against the United States and
its allies.
The CyDAE with its veritable panoply of malicious
capabilities 99 coupled with inhumanly fast operating speed, begins
AUPress/Papers/cpp_0001_yannakogeorgos_cyber_Attribution_challenge.PDF
[https://perma.cc/U2G7-U6U7].
97
One of the foremost thinkers in the decentralized AI space, Ben Goertzel,
predicts the AGI arising from a network of smaller AI that share information and
grow together. See, e.g., SINGULARITYNET, WHITEPAPER 2.0 (Feb. 2019),
https://public.singularitynet.io/whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RZQ-AAVB]
[hereinafter SingularityNET Whitepaper].
98
LoPucki, supra note 55, at 900.
99
CyDAE-like entities “are capable of inflicting massive damage on social and
economic systems. They could shut down human computing, steal and release
confidential information, and wreak havoc by seizing control of the internet of
things.” Id. at 902.
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its cyber-operations against both State and private actors in the
United States by surreptitiously monitoring private networks;
parsing and changing vast datasets after copying them; or infecting
thousands of Internet of Things (“IoT”) devices 100 with “smartbotnet” 101 malware-like programs. 102 The following section
illustrates the characteristics of a CyDAE—based on existing AI
characteristics and qualities—that would support this CyDAE’s
malicious cyber-activity. 103
A. Uniquely Effective Characteristics and Cyber-Capabilities of a
CyDAE
In cybersecurity, speed is everything. The term “breakout time”
is a metric for sophistication of a malicious cyber-activity; it
“measures the speed with which adversaries accomplish lateral
movements in the victim [network] environment after their initial
[access].” 104 This is important “because it represents the time limit
for defenders to respond and contain or remediate an intrusion
before it spreads widely in their [network] environment and leads to
a major breach.” 105 Cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike measured the
fastest State-attributed cyber-actors (Russia) to have an average
breakout time of eighteen minutes, meaning it took those actors an
“IoT” refers to the networks created by everyday devices with built-in
computers, which range from refrigerators to doorbells to thermostats to
children’s stuffed animals.
101
In simplistic terms, a “botnet” is a network of devices hijacked and
controlled by a hacker through malware. The hacker can harness the computing
power of such a network for nefarious purposes like denial of service attacks
(flooding victim networks with signals causing the system to slow down or crash).
102
Maybe to achieve decentralization, the CyDAE’s propagates its code
through IoT devices much in the same way a botnet operates.
103
This analysis does not consider destructive attacks on critical infrastructure,
although that kind of attack would prove to have kinetic effects, elevating a
CyDAE’s malicious cyber-activities into the realm of jus ad bellum and jus in
bello. Still, a CyDAE coordinating digital attacks in warfare terms is an interesting
proposition.
104
CROWDSTRIKE, 2019 GLOBAL THREAT REPORT, ADVERSARY TRADECRAFT
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SPEED 14 (2019), https://www.crowdstrike.com/
resources/reports/2019-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/ [https://perma.cc/6ZJHT6LK] [hereinafter CrowdStrike Report].
105
Id.
100
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average of eighteen minutes from when they accessed the victim
network to begin causing harm. 106 The CyDAE, which can process
information at beyond-human speeds, could hypothetically achieve
a breakout time of seconds or less. Such unfathomable speed already
dominates securities markets. Many Wall Street firms practice
“high-frequency trading,” a technique in which they use algorithms
so fast that they can “front-run” purchases of stock. In short, the
algorithm detects the signal of another entity making a large buy
order for stock before the buy order signal reaches the exchange,
races ahead, and purchases all the shares before the first buy order
goes through, then immediately sell the shares at a higher price to
the entity that made the initial first buy order. 107 The same kind of
“front-running” technique could be used by a CyDAE to scan
networks, find defense mechanisms, and modify or adapt its
behavior in accordance with the type of defense mechanism.
Alternatively, the CyDAE could hypothetically “front-run” decoy
signals indicative of normal activity around the network to lull
defenders into a false sense of security.
According to CrowdStrike, “[a]fter attackers obtain their initial
foothold, their first order of business is to get oriented within their
newly accessed environment before determining next steps toward
their objective.” 108 This deliberative period, for major attacks, occurs
because the human hacker(s) strategize and plan the next steps of
the attack, based on the network landscape. It is not farfetched to
think that a CyDAE, with speed undetectable by humans, could
deliberate for fractions of seconds and unfurl its digital tendrils
through the network at the speed of a lightning strike. Even if it were
detected by network defenses, by the time that the signal indicating
a breach reaches a human overseer (assuming the CyDAE cannot
reroute the signal), the CyDAE could have moved, spread, attacked,
changed its strategy, or deployed decoys many times over. The highfrequency trading algorithms mentioned above can execute
Id. at 14–15.
Elvis Picardo, Understanding High-Frequency Trading Terminology,
INVESTOPEDIA (last updated May 30, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/
articles/active-trading/042414/youd-better-know-your-highfrequency-tradingterminology.asp [https://perma.cc/U7TD-BU7Z].
108
CrowdStrike Report, supra note 104, at 21.
106
107
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thousands of trades per second, a speed considered slow in the
industry, which measures performance as number of trades in
microseconds, or millionths of a second. 109 A logical inference then
is that if an algorithm can execute one trade per microsecond, it
could conceivably execute one million trades per second. 110 Using
the metrics of Wall Street for the CyDAE hypothetical, a CyDAE
could cause substantial havoc on a network in the same eighteen
minute time frame (a time frame equal to one billion and eighty
million microseconds) it took the fastest human cyber-operators in
the world in 2018 to get started on their attack once they infiltrated
the system. By the time the world’s best human cyber-defense
operator finds and identifies a cyber intrusion from a CyDAE, picks
up the phone and calls leadership, the CyDAE could have already
stolen or copied the company’s information, transferred funds,
and/or modified important data, before making itself undetectable
again.
B. Malware Infiltration
The first step would be for the CyDAE to infiltrate its target
system—whether the system be a government network or private
network. The CyDAE’s machine learning ANN would attempt to
penetrate the system with a phishing attack to gain access to the
network. For example, the CyDAE could “scrape” LinkedIn for
employees with access to the network, mimic one of those
employees’ writing styles, and draft a decoy email to another
employee the CyDAE determines is a “friend” of the first employee.
This decoy email would act as a vehicle for the deployment of
malware on the victim network.
Many malicious cyber-activities come from “malware,” an
umbrella term for malicious computer code with many

109
Getting Up to Speed on High-Frequency Trading, FINRA (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://www.finra.org/investors/getting-speed-high-frequency-trading
[https://perma.cc/L42C-QWJ3].
110
For comparison’s sake, a fast-human typist can type 70–100 words per
minute. Kimberlee Leonard, What is a Good Typing Speed Per Minute?” CHRON
(Jan. 29, 2019), https://smallbusiness.chron.com/good-typing-speed-per-minute71789.html [https://perma.cc/69MU-HHP2].
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expressions. 111 Malign actors often use malware as a method to
infiltrate a system initially—tricking a user into executing the code,
a strategy often referred to as “phishing.” 112 Once executed the
malware can execute a ransomware 113 program; send “bots” 114 across
the network to hijack computers to use in distributed denial-ofservice attacks (“DDoS”) against other, outside networks 115; or
install keyloggers that record every keystroke on a particular
computer (including passwords). 116 Malware, however, has
detectable signatures, and in some cases, sends traceable “command
and control” signals to its operator requesting instructions. 117 In that
sense, malware is “noisy”; cyber-defense infrastructure becomes
suspicious when an unknown program runs in its environment. 118
But, a smarter malware CyDAE could adapt itself to be less
noisy, release CyDAE “smartbots” that mutate and either keep in
constant communication with the CyDAE, act completely
autonomously, or even sit dormant in a system until it detects a
trigger to act. If a smartbot program includes some kind of evolving
DOJ Cyber Report, supra note 89, at 25–28.
See Jennifer Lynch, Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Crime Control Methods
and their Effectiveness in Combating Phishing Attacks, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
259, 259–261 (2005) (defining and describing “phishing”).
113
A “Ransomware” attack “blocks a victim’s access to data on its systems,
typically by encrypting the data and demanding that the victim pay a ransom,
often in the form of a difficult-to-trace virtual currency, to restore the data.” DOJ
Cyber Report, supra note 89, at 24.
114
The term “bot” refers to a program that executes commands for a simple
purpose, but sometimes that program is malware. In the cyber world, malign
actors send malware to tens or hundreds of IoT devices, and if executed, the
malware turns the IoT devices into bots that the actor can use to coordinate cyberattacks.
115
DDoS “involves the orchestrated transmission of communications
engineered to overwhelm the victim’s network’s connection to the internet in
order to disrupt that network’s ability to send or receive communications.” DOJ
Cyber Report, supra note 89, at 23.
116
See Paul Koob, Not Enough Fingers in the Dam: A Call for Federal
Regulation of Keyloggers, 28 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 125, 126–27
(2009) (defining and describing “keyloggers”).
117
Interview with Leonard Bailey, supra note 88.
118
Cyber Adversary Olympics: It’s Russia for the Gold and North Korea (!) for
the Silver, CYBERLAW PODCAST (Feb. 25, 2019, minute 45:00),
https://www.steptoe.com/feed-Cyberlaw.rss [https://perma.cc/H276-29LY].
111
112
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machine learning algorithm, it would not need to send the easily
detectable command and control signals to the controlling entity
(whether human or CyDAE), but could instead know the
circumstances or triggers in the network that signal when they
should mount a DDoS attack or execute their malicious program. 119
Theoretically CyDAE smartbots could stifle attempts to
discover it by changing their code as a reaction to their environment
analogous to the high-frequency algorithm anticipating other
entities’ stock orders described above. That is, a bot-detecting
software sends a signal to a human controller alerting him/her that
the computer is infected by a “bot,” identified by a signature, Code
A. In the time the signal was sent to the human controller, the
CyDAE smartbot changes its signature from Code A to Code G. The
bot-detecting software then sends a signal to the human controller
identifying Code G, but the CyDAE smartbot then changes from
Code G to Code W, perpetuating the cycle. The human controller
starts receiving the signals from the bot-detection software, but
cannot keep up with the changing smartbot code, and thus cannot
find it. Indeed, a CyDAE smartbot could presumably operate
without sending any command or control signals back to the CyDAE
itself, thus insulating the CyDAE from easy detection. With the
placement of its CyDAE smartbots, the CyDAE’s DDoS
infrastructure is set, and it can start harnessing the vast computing
power of its smartbots.
C. Data-Based Attacks
For years, the dark web and sites like WikiLeaks existed as
repositories for leaked, sensitive, classified, or stolen information
and data. Malicious cyber-activities aimed at stealing data for
monetary gain or exposing protected information has become an
increasingly popular form of attack. For example, self-proclaimed
“hacktivists” infiltrated Ashley Madison, the dating website aimed
at people seeking extramarital affairs, and they released user data
from the site, including “users’ real names, banking data, credit card

119

DOJ Cyber Report, supra note 89, at 23.
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transactions, [and] secret sexual fantasies.” 120 Indeed, the United
States government arrested the Chinese national accused of the
notorious hack of United States Government Office of Personnel
Management (“OPM”) which resulted in the release of millions of
federal employees’ personal information being released on the dark
web. 121 This sort of harassment, which includes “broadcasting
personal information about the victim on the Internet, exposing him
or her to . . . harassment by others,” is known as “doxing.” 122
Once the CyDAE gains access to the organization’s network, it
spreads, and rapidly scans for easily identifiable personal
information, targeting high ranking individuals in the organization.
With incredible speed, it sends the data back to itself and into a
decentralized repository akin to a blockchain. The CyDAE may
have its own site on the Internet to release the information publicly,
or could send the information to another website like WikiLeaks.
Alternatively, the CyDAE could speed through the network,
systematically deleting the organization’s data, in a similar fashion
to the Sony hack, 123 maneuvering to avoid detection by the cyberdefenses of the victim organizations. Or, the CyDAE could modify
the data as it shoots though the network, in an attack called “data
poisoning,” which targets the learning process of AI systems. As
discussed above, AI systems, particularly machine learning and
ANN systems, require vast amounts of labeled and categorized data
to learn. Data poisoning attacks occur when “malicious users inject
false training data with the aim of corrupting the learned model.” 124

A Dating Site and Corporate Cyber–Security Lessons to Be Learned, PANDA
MEDIACENTER
(Oct.
6,
2018),
https://www.pandasecurity.com/
mediacenter/security/lessons-ashley-madison-data-breach/
[https://perma.cc/GHL7-X8HC].
121
Complaint, United States v. Pingan, No. 17MJ2970 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
2017).
122
DOJ Cyber Report, supra note 89, at 33.
123
Raphael Satter, North Korean Programmer Charged in Sony Hack,
NEWS
HOUR
(Sept.
6,
2018),
WannaCry
Attack,
PBS
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/north-korean-programmer-charged-insony-hack-wannacry-attack [https://perma.cc/JQ2S-JX9H].
124
JACOB STEINHARDT, PANG WEI KOH, & PERCY LIANG, 31ST CONFERENCE
ON NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS, CERTIFIED DEFENSES FOR
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In an age when States strive to achieve AI superiority, ruining an
AI’s ability to learn would be an effective tactic to disrupt the
development of an AI system, especially when many ANNs and
other machine learning algorithms are unexplainable black boxes,
preventing developers from seeing the process from which the AI
system derived its output or conclusion. A CyDAE could scan vast
quantities of data, relabeling them (from “cat” to “dog,” for
example), or replacing legitimate data with fake or inaccurate data
points.
Beyond seizure, manipulation, or theft of information, malicious
cyber activities can result in physical consequences. The Stuxnet
malware was built to infiltrate industrial systems software, which
allow computers to control physical industrial processes like
opening and closing valves. 125 Stuxnet caused centrifuges that
processed material for the creation of nuclear energy at the Natanz
Iranian nuclear facility to malfunction by spinning extraordinarily
fast, while simultaneously sending signals to the monitoring
computer systems that showed the centrifuges were working
properly. 126 Alternatively, some malware can render entire computer
systems completely useless. If a CyDAE were capable of infiltrating
industrial control systems in a similar fashion to the Stuxnet virus,
it could result in repercussions beyond data destruction. Opening
valves in chemical plants could result in noxious chemical leaks or
spills. Hydroelectric dams that control the flow of thousands of tons
of water could malfunction and result in flooding. Manipulating the
software that controls the timing of traffic lights could result in
extreme obstructions in vehicular traffic, or even worse, traffic
collisions. The cyberthreat to such critical infrastructure is real, and
an entity like a CyDAE could cause substantial physical damage and

DATA POISONING ATTACKS (2017), https://papers.nips.cc/paper/6943-certifieddefenses-for-data-poisoning-attacks.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWL6-2UUT].
125
Stuxnet is probably the closest malware to a CyDAE. It was capable of
replicating itself, sending false signals to hide its presence from outside detection.
Bruce Schneier, The Story Behind the Stuxnet Virus, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2010)
https://www.forbes.com/2010/10/06/iran-nuclear-computer-technology-securitystuxnet-worm.html#6ebd5d5c51e8 [https://perma.cc/Q5X9-P8AW].
126
See id.
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casualties if it interrupted or interfered with the function of such
industrial control systems.
VI. THE CYDAE’S ATTRIBUTION SHIELD
If it were to exist, a CyDAE’s beyond-human capabilities would
present difficulty to even the most sophisticated human
cybersecurity experts. Whether or not a CyDAE could be detected
and identified are two major questions, but even if they are
detectable and identifiable, to what degree could the CyDAE’s
activity be attributed to a human actor in the current legal landscape?
This section attempts to examine the relevant legal issues.
The general characteristics of a CyDAE present inherent
problems to attribution. International law’s two current tests were
developed in the analog world, where physical beings and things
could cross territorial boundaries or kill human beings with guns,
knives, and bombs.
These legal tests have high burdens. The act-centric “effective
control test” will permit legal attribution of an independent actor’s
acts to a State if clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that the
actor was sufficiently under the State’s control, because the State
“directed and enforced the perpetration of the acts.” 127 This test
would always fail to permit attribution if the factual scenario
involved a CyDAE. Even if a State released a CyDAE into
cyberspace, the CyDAE is not a group, or a person, or any kind of
legal entity. Neither international law nor any State in particular
proscribes a framework for an autonomous legal AI entity.
Moreover, traditional technical attribution techniques already
experience difficulty tracing a cyber-event to the computer or
operator. Even if a forensic whiz traced the cyber-activity to a
CyDAE, the analysis would stop there, as the operator would likely
have no way of piercing the CyDAE’s unexplainable system to
gather clues about its programming. Assuming arguendo, that a
computer forensics expert could infiltrate the black box system of a
CyDAE, the scientist could potentially gather clues about its origin
and motives, but considering it acts autonomously, with no
“command and control” architecture, there would be no
127

See Nicaragua Case, supra note 81.
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breadcrumbs to follow from the CyDAE to its human creator(s).
Even if forensic technicians could trace a CyDAE’s code to one
node in its decentralized network, the destruction or examination of
that node would reveal little, considering the nature of
decentralization.
The actor-centric “complete dependence” test requires proving,
with clear and convincing evidence, that the actor is an “organ” of
the State and that an agency relationship exists between the two, and
is even more difficult to prove than the “effective control test”
above. 128 Showing “complete dependence” of a CyDAE on a State
would be virtually impossible—demonstrating an agency
relationship between a CyDAE acting autonomously and a State
would require specific forensic evidence. The same issues arising
under the effective control test also arise under the “complete
dependence test.” The unexplainability of a CyDAE would
obfuscate any connection to the State, and the fact that the CyDAE
needs no instruction or commands to pursue its programmed goals
further distances the CyDAE from any States. Furthermore, the
CyDAE cannot be considered an actor because it lacks legal
personhood or entityhood.
The difficulties in attributing malicious cyber-activities to a
State multiply when applied to CyDAE hypotheticals. Policymakers
must begin to address such issues so regulatory structures can be
built before CyDAEs emerge on the world stage. The next section
contains a series of proposals intended to challenge and encourage
policy and lawmakers to consider the importance of anticipating the
existence of near-future, multiform CyDAEs.
VII. PROPOSALS
The idea of preemptively regulating AI is not new. Elon Musk,
for instance, declared: “I’m increasingly inclined to think that there
should be some regulatory oversight, maybe at the national and
international level, just to make sure that we don’t do something
very foolish.” 129 Many thinkers in the AI field endorse and embrace
128

Id.
Elon Musk, We Are “Summoning a Demon” with Artificial Intelligence, UPI
(Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/2014/10/27/Elon-Musk129
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the responsible development of AI systems. 130 This analysis suggests
four general, but synergistic proposals with the goal of presenting a
holistic approach to regulating future CyDAEs, and AI systems
broadly. 131
Proposal 1: AI Registry
All AI systems should be required to be registered with a
legislatively or executively mandated agency or commission. The
registration would be similar to the way that money services
businesses must register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network in the United States. The registration would require basic
information about the creator(s) and/or owner, whether it be an
individual, corporation, or other legal arrangement. Such an idea is
not novel: the first decentralized AI marketplace requires
registration for AI to participate in its platform. 132 The registry
would make basic information publicly available and accessible, as
well as promote transparent use of CyDAEs and AI systems
generally. Notably, a CyDAE released for the specific purpose of
orchestrating cyber-attacks would likely not be registered by the
entity that created it, so there must be some paradigm to deal with
unregistered and malicious CyDAEs.
Proposal 2: Explainable AI Systems
AI systems should be primarily explainable. Some see benefits
to unexplainable AI systems, or at least, they view unexplainable
systems as the result of AI algorithms that process information at a
level so advanced, that explaining its processes would be
ineffective. 133 Perhaps every step of an AI system’s process need not
be explainable so to not impede “the cases that give machine
We-are-summoning-a-demon-with-artificial-intelligence/4191414407652
[https://perma.cc/WEY5-8EFJ].
130
See SINGULARITYNET WHITEPAPER, supra note 97, at 6, 54.
131
Importantly, this analysis focused on CyDAEs as a cybersecurity and
national security threat. However, CyDAEs may arise in other forms, and so many
of these proposals overlap with benevolent CyDAEs as well.
132
SINGULARITYNET WHITEPAPER, supra note 97, at 17.
133
See, e.g., Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of
Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018).
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learning its greatest value: true patterns that exceed human
imagination.” 134 At the very least, “[w]e need the developers to show
their work.” 135 In other words, policymakers should implement an
explainability standard that requires, at a minimum, that the
programmer or an expert reviewing the programmer’s notes be able
to explain the rules built into its AI system. Of course, that
assumption requires that the programmer or creator be known,
which underscores the importance of a registry.
Proposal 3: Legal Personhood Structure with Human Control
The most important feature of an AI regulatory regime is human
control; thus, any AI system, and especially autonomous AI
systems, should have human-controlled fail-safe mechanisms built
in so no “loss of general control” occurs. 136 Regardless of the form,
autonomous AI entities need a personhood arrangement so the law
can handle what an AI entity is. Perhaps the personhood
arrangement should be an autonomous entity, allowing an AI to
govern itself. Should that be the case, as a part of that AI entity’s
incorporation or legal personhood creation, a human or corporate
overseer entity should be tethered to that AI, with some affirmation
and/or description of how that human-controlled legal entity
maintains oversight, no matter how attenuated that oversight may
be. 137
Proposal 4: Universal Jurisdiction for CyDAEs
What happens under the framework above if a State discovers
an unregistered, unclaimed, unbridled CyDAE operating in
cyberspace, and attribution cannot be made? CyDAEs should be
subject to something close to universal jurisdiction, considering the
threats and difficulties—both practical difficulties and legal
challenges—presented in this article. Cyberspace is everywhere and
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1138.
136
See Scherer, supra note 35, at 366 (discussing “control”).
137
A kill-switch or other mechanism controlled by a human that can deactivate
the AI entity. Additionally, autonomous entity ownership of other AI entities
should be prohibited (no AI “shells” should be allowed). The discussion of what
mechanisms of control should be required is a different and expansive discussion.
134
135
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nowhere, and it confounds traditional notions of sovereignty,
jurisdiction, and territoriality. Decentralization further complicates
the issue because it allows an entity or program to exist universally
with only being partially located on a physical server. Moreover,
data and computing can shift around the globe instantly, so what
may be under one State’s jurisdiction in one second may be in
another State’s jurisdiction the next second, and yet another State’s
jurisdiction the third second.
Jurisdiction over such evanescent and transient entities requires
multilateral agreements on jurisdiction. The likelihood of such a
multilateral agreement seems slim, considering current global
multilateral understandings of sub-armed conflict and malicious
cyber-activities are uncertain, and the global community cannot
achieve consensus on even those fundamental rules. 138
Universal jurisdiction is the doctrine that permits “any nation
[to] prosecute universal offenses, even over the objection of the
defendants’ and victims’ home states.” 139 Historically, universal
jurisdiction applied primarily to pirates because “traditional
jurisdictional categories did not cover piracy.” 140 This proposal
seeks universal jurisdiction—not necessarily to prosecute—but to
“summarily execute” a CyDAE because of its existence in
cyberspace, which is “a global commons” that “lay[s] outside the
territorial jurisdiction of any nation.” 141 Indeed, a CyDAE cannot be
captured and brought to court in a State jurisdiction. Nor, without
attribution, can the creator be held responsible for the acts of the
CyDAE. Therefore, this proposal suggests that an unregistered,
unattributable CyDAE should be subject to summary destruction by
any State. This universal jurisdiction would not permit one State to
destroy the physical computer systems located in another State,
rather, it would permit a State to use cyber-capabilities to disrupt,

See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 80, at 45–53.
Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 183 (2004).
140
Id. at 190.
141
Id. While the analogy between cyberspace and the high seas fails in many
ways, the evolution of the decentralization of cyberspace creates a problem of
jurisdiction.
138
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confound, destroy, undo, erase, corrupt, or otherwise destroy the
program, code, or signals that make up the CyDAE.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The ways in which AI will shape and transform society are
difficult to predict, considering the inscrutable nature of AI systems.
AI systems may exist on a different level, outside the bounds of
human-imposed strictures. As this new and exciting technology
develops, the world must, at the very least, provide legal and policy
guardrails for AI technology to prevent it from careening out of
human comprehension and control. This analysis used the
hypothetical CyDAE to exemplify potential worst-case scenarios in
AI evolution. Although hypothetical, the CyDAE idea presented
here is an amalgamation of existing technologies, AI models, and
realistic theories. The four proposals proffered above aim to guide
humanity into a symbiotic relationship with AI. Setting parameters
for AI system development now will allow a future in which society
is not threatened by CyDAEs but improved by their existence.
Indeed, monitoring and regulating AI in the physical world seems
intuitive—robots have physical effects and liability will attach to
someone for the results of robotic acts. The esoteric and tangible
effects resulting from action in the world of cyberspace however,
are much more difficult to comprehend and fit into existing legal
frameworks. In Neuromancer, William Gibson described
cyberspace as a “consensual hallucination experienced daily by
billions of legitimate operators, in every nation . . . .” 142 Much like a
hallucination or dream, events in cyberspace are difficult to
comprehend and harder still to predict. In Gibson’s cyberspace,
several AGI-level CyDAE’s sought to achieve goals not discernable
to humans; killing, stealing, and maiming in the process. It is the
illegitimate operators in cyberspace, like the incomprehensible and
complex CyDAEs dreamt up by Gibson—beyond human
understanding, beyond the reach of human senses, and with opaque
motivations—that will challenge humanity the most in the future to
come.
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